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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
K. E. SOVEREEN, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
Case No. 15782 
TERRI MEADOWS, 
Defendant/Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for unlawful detainer arising 
out of the landlord/tenant relationship between the parties. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Plaintiff obtained a default judgment. From 
said judgment, and from unsuccessful attempts to obtain 
relief from said judgment, Defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and 
remand to the District Court for trial. 
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'' 
Defendant paying $150.00 in attorney's fees to Plaintiff 
within 30 days of the date of the order (Record, pg. 30). A 
Notice of Intention to Appeal was timely filed (Record, pg. 
21) . 
Subsequently, Defendant filed a Motion to Stay 
Order Granting Attorney's Fees or in the Alternative Payment 
of Attorney's Fees into Court. Plaintiff's counsel responded 
by sending an ex parte letter to the judge assigned to hear 
the motion opposing the relief sought (Record pg. 22). In 
support of said Motion was an Affidavit of Impecuniosity 
executed by Defendant (Record pg. 29). The court, heard the 
Motion on March 20, 1978. Neither Plaintiff nor his attorney 
appeared. The Court ordered Defendant to pay the previously-
ordered $150.00 into court instead of to Plaintiff (Record, 
pg. 33). 
On March 13, 1978, Defendant's Answer and Counter-
claim was filed (Record pg. 23-26). The Counterclaim alleged 
that on January 6, 1978, Plaintiff confiscated all personal 
property of Defendant located in the apartment. The legal 
theories alleged were conversion, noncompliance with the 
exemption statute, wrongful attachment, and deceptive or 
unconscionable act or practice. Pursuant to the Counterclaim, 
a Motion for Writ of Replevin was filed (Record, pg. 31-32). 
It was supported by an Affidavit of Defendant in compliance 
with Rule 64B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
-3-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff (landlord) and Defendant (tenant) entered 
into an oral rental agreement for an apartment located in 
Salt Lake City, Utah at $135.00 per month rent. According 
to Plaintiff's Complaint, an eviction notice was served upon 
Defendant on November 3, 1977 (Record, pg. 4). Plaintiff 
filed a Complaint on December 12, 1977, alleging that De-
fendant was in unlawful detainer on the basis of nonpayment 
of rent, and obtained a Judgment by Default on January 5, 
1978. Said judgment included_:tx.ghl~_dfilna~es__g.ccru~~g from 
~---------- ---------- ----
N~---=9_2_7 until ~~e _J>re_mises were vacated, plus costs 
and attorneys fees (Record, pg. 17-18). Defendant vacated 
the premises on January 6, 1978, after she was served with a 
writ of restitution on that date. 
A Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was filed 
on January 16, 1978, listing several reasons in support of 
the motion (Record, pg. 9-10). Said motion was accompanied 
by an Affidavit of Defendant, alleging that she first re-
ceived a copy of the Complaint after the default judgment 
was obtained, and that she disputed the amount and nature of 
relief granted in said judgment (Record pg. 15-16). 
The Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was heard 
on March 3, 1978. The court granted the Motion subject to 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Affidavit also described the items of personal prope~ty 
taken, and expressed the belief that said property was 
exempt within the meaning of the provisions of Utah Code 
§78-21-1. 
The Motion for Writ of Replevin was heard on 
March 30, 1978. Said Motion was opposed by Plaintiff on the 
theory that Defendant could not proceed until she had paid 
$150.00 into court. Defendant attended the hearing, and 
offered to testify as to her financial inability to pay any 
amount. The court denied the Motion. 
On April 13, 1978, the Court, based upon the non-
payment of $150.00 by Defendant within 30 days of its previous 
order, entered an Order denying Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PORTIONS OF THE JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT 
ARE CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE UTAH LAW, 
AND THUS ARE VOID. 
The default judgment obtained by Plaintiff (Record, 
pg. 17-18) awarded damages of $479.00, plus treble damages 
in the amount of $13.50 per day from November 6, 1977 to the 
date on which the premises were vacated, costs in the amount 
of $27.90, attorney's fees in the amount of $100.00, all 
-4-
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amounts to draw interest at 8%, and a writ of restitution. 
The total amount of the judgment is $1,443.90, plus 8% 
interest accruing from January 6, 1978. Substantially all 
of said default judgment is contrary to Utah statutory and 
case law, and thus should be declared void or modified 
accordingly. 
A. DEFENDANT WAS NOT IN UNLAWFUL DE-
TAINER, AND THUS IT WAS ERROR TO 
AWARD TREBLE DAMAGES AND A WRIT 
OF RESTITUTION. 
Utah's unlawful detainer statute, Utah Code §78-36-1 
et seq., governs actions by a landlord to evict a tenant. 
This Court has reviewed this statute on a number of occasions, 
and has repeatedly ruled that, due to the summary procedure 
and severe remedy involved, the statute must be strictly 
complied with before the cause of action provided may be ma 
maintained to enforce the obligations imposed by it; see 
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 U.468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952), and Van 
Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 U.2d 367, 393 P.2d 468 (1964). In 
addition, this Court has established tort liability for 
noncompliance with the statute; see King v. Firm, 3 U2d 
419, 285 P.2d 1114 (1955). 
-5-
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Prior to the filing of an unlawful detainer action, 
an appropriate eviction notice must be served upon the 
tenant. In the present case, the unlawful detainer action 
was based upon nonpayment of rent. The provisions of Utah 
Code §78-36-3(3) govern what constitutes unlawful detainer 
and what the eviction notice must provide in the case of 
nonpayment of rent: 
A tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer: 
(3) When he continues in possession ... after 
default in the payment of rent and after a 
notice in writing requiring in the alternative 
the payment of the rent or the surrender of 
the detained premises, shall have remained 
uncomplied with for a period of three days 
after service thereof ... 
In other words, the eviction notice must state that the 
tenant has the alternative of paying the rent owed or va-
eating the premises within three days after service of the 
eviction notice. 
The eviction notice in this case (Record, pg. 4) 
did not provide the alternative to the tenant to pay the 
rent owed within three days, and therefore did not comply 
with the statute. In the case of American Holding Co. v. 
~. 23 U.2d 432, 464 P.2d 592 (1970), this Court con-
sidered a factual situation where the unlawful detainer 
action was based on nonpayment of rent, and the eviction 
notice did not provide the alternative of paying the rent 
-6-
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owed. This Court held that the statutory requirements were 
not complied, and that the landlord was not entitled to 
maintain an action for unlawful detainer. In Jacobson v. 
Swan, 3 U.2d 59, 278 P.2d 294 (1954), the eviction notice 
served was simply an unconditional notice to quit premises 
with no alternative provided to pay the rent owed. This 
Court ruled that the landlord's damages should not have been 
trebled, but should have been limited to the amount of rent 
prescribed in the rental agreement. In the present case, 
under American Holding Co. and Jacobson, Plaintiff was not 
entitled to treble damages or restitution of the premises, 
since the eviction notice did not comply with the statute. 
In Perkins v. Spencer, supra, the landlord did n~ 
comply with the statute providing the manner in which the 
eviction notice must be served. This Court ruled that under 
such circumstances the landlord was entitled to nominal 
damages only, and thus could not maintain an action for 
unlawful detainer when the statutes were not followed. 
Thus, in the present case, Plaintiff was entitled to only 
nominal damages, and was not entitled to either treble 
damages or restitution of the premises. 
In the present case Plaintiff improperly executed 
upon the writ of restitution, by having it served one day 
after the obtaining of the default judgment. The provisions 
-7-
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of Utah Code §78-36-10, as interpreted in the case of Monter 
v. Kratzers Specialty Bread Co., 29 U.2d 18, 504 P.2d 40 
(1972), provides that in an unlawful detainer action for 
nonpayment of rent, execution upon a judgment shall not 
issue until five days expire after the entry of the judgment, 
in which period the tenant may satisfy the judgment and be 
restored to the premises. Again, it is clear that Plaintiff 
did not comply with applicable law. 
For all the above reasons, Defendant was never in 
unlawful detainer. Based upon the noncompliance with the 
statutes, those portions of the default judgment awarding in 
excess of nominal damages are void. 
B. PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO 
RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Statutory authority does not appear in Utah's 
unlawful detainer statute authorizing the recovery of attorneys 
fees in an eviction action. This is due in part to the 
treble damage provision in Utah Code §78-36-10, which operates 
as a statutory penalty in the landlord's favor where a 
tenant is found to be in unlawful detainer. Therefore, the 
recovery of attorney's fees must be based on another legal 
theory. However, such a theory is not discernable from the 
record. Plaintiff never alleged any agreement or other 
statutory authority providing for the recovery of attorney's 
fees. In the absence of such an agreement or statutory 
-8-
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authority, the common law rule that attorneys fees are not 
recoverable applies. Therefore, that portion of Plaintiff's 
default judgment providing for attorney's fees is void. 
Point II of this Brief will address the improprie0 
of conditioning the setting aside of a default judgment upon 
the payment of attorneys fees. It is indeed ironic that, in 
a case where attorney's fee could not have been recovered 
had the matter been contested, the setting aside of a default 
judgment could be conditioned upon payment of attorney's 
fees. For this additional reason, the awards of attorneys 
fees, both in the default judgment and in the conditional 
order setting aside the judgment, should be considered void. 
C. PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO 
RECOVER COSTS. 
It is not the position of Defendant that costs are 
not recoverable in an unlawful detainer action, but instead 
that costs are not recoverable under the facts and circum-
stances of this case. In order for a party to recover 
costs, an affidavit must be submitted, pursuant to Rule 
54(d) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows: 
How Assessed. The party who claims his 
costs must within five days after the 
entry of judgment serve upon the adverse 
party against whom costs are claimed, a 
copy of a memorandum of the items of his 
costs and necessary disbursements in the 
action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating 
that to affiants' knowledge the items are 
correct, and that the disbursements have 
been necessarily incurred in the action or 
proceeding. 
-9-
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In using the word "must", the language of the Rule is clear 
that such a memorandum of costs is mandatory and must be 
submitted in accordance with the time provision in order for a 
party to recover costs. 
In the present case, it is apparent from the record 
that no such memorandum of costs was ever submitted. Therefore, 
Plaintiff is not entitled to recover costs, and that portion of 
the default judgment awarding costs is void. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN CONDITIONING THE GRANT OF AN 
ORDER SETTING ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
UPON THE PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The statutory authority for setting aside default 
judgments is found in Rules 55(c) and 60(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. In addition, this Court has rendered 
numerous decisions interpreting the statutory provisions. 
These cases support Defendant's position that the condition 
of paying attorney's fees, under the facts and circumstances 
of this case, was an abuse of discretion and therefore 
constituted reversible error. 
Several principles have been repeatedly cited by 
this Court as to setting aside of default judgments. First, 
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it is the declared policy of the court that in cases of 
uncertainty, default judgments shall be set aside to allow 
trial on the merits; Locke v. Peterson, 3 U2d 415, 285 P.2d 
1111 (1955). Second, it is an abuse of discretion to refuse 
to vacate a default if there is a timely application and 
there are reasonable grounds to do so, and doubts should be 
resolved in favor of setting aside default judgments; 
Chrysler v. Chrysler, 4 U2d 415, 303 P.2d 995 (1956). 
Third, trial courts should be generally indulgent in per-
mitting full inquiry, and it is an abuse of discretion to 
refuse to vacate a default judgment where there are reasonahl 
grounds and excuse for Defendant's failure to appear, and a 
timely application is made to set it aside; Mayhew v. Standar 
Gilsonite, 14 U2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962). Fourth, default 
judgments are not favored by the courts nor are they in the 
interest of fair play; Heathman v. Fabian and Clendenin, 
14 U2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (1962). Fifth, courts should be 
somewhat indulgent in setting aside defaults; McKean v. 
Mountain View Memorial Estates, 17 U2d 323, 4 U P.2d 129 
(1966). Sixth, courts should be liberal in allowing parties 
to get to the merits of the case; Barber v. Calder, 
522 P.2d 700 (Ut. 1974). 
-11-
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The decision of this Court closest in point is 
Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc. v. Chavez, 565 P.2d 1142 (Ut. 
1977). In that case the motion to set aside the default 
iudgment was based upon an uncontroverted affidavit of the 
~fendant stating he had not been served with the Complaint. 
~e Court reversed the denial of the motion, the concurring 
~inion of Justice Crockett focused on the fact that the 
affidavit in support of the motion was unrefuted. The 
language of the opinion is significant: 
In the absence of a challenging pleading 
of equal dignity with his affidavit, there 
is no basis upon which the court could find 
contrary to his averment. In accordance 
with what has been said above, and with the 
declared policy of the law to be liberal in 
setting aside a default judgment to the end 
that a party may have his day in court, I 
would remand for that purpose. Id, at 1144. 
The holding of this case only remanded the matter for an 
evidentiary hearing on whether the Defendant was personally 
~rved. In the present case the uncontroverted affidavit of 
defendant (Record, pg. 15-16) alleges that she was never 
served with the Complaint. Plaintiff's affidavit also 
disputes the amount and nature of the default judgment, and 
much of this Brief addresses other improprieties in Plaintiff's 
~tions and in the default judgment. Therefore it is appropriate 
for this Court to reverse and set aside the default judgment 
in its entirety. 
-12-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
There are many other cases on point, most of them 
citing identical or similar principles to the ones already 
mentioned; see, for example, Egan v. Egan, 560 P.2d 704 (Ut. 
1977); Bowen Trucking, Inc., v. Public Service Comm., 
559 P.2d 954 (1977); Dynapac, Inc., v. Innovations, Inc., 
550 P.2d 191 (Ut. 1976); Westinghouse Electric Supply Co., 
v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Ut. 1975); 
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 U2d 65, 475 
P.2d 1005 (1970), Bowen v. Olson, 246 P.2d 602 (Ut. 1952); 
and Dixon v. Dixon, 240 P.2d 1211 (Ut. 1952); Woody v. 
Rhodes, 23 U2d 249, 461 P.2d 465 (1969); Utah Sand & Gravel 
Products Corp. v. Tolbert, 16 U2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
Ney v. Harrison, 5 U2d 217, P.2d 1114 (1956); Kelly v. Scott, 
5 U2d 159, 298 P.2d 821 (1956). 
Defendant's motion to set aside the default judg-
ment was filed eleven (11) days after its entry. The motion 
was supported by an affidavit of defendant (Record, pg. 15-
16) and was uncontroverted by counteraffidavit. As shown in 
Point I, substantial portions of the default judgment are 
void. In particular, Point I.B. demonstrates why attorneys 
fees were not recoverable, and therefore should not have 
been granted. Yet the order granting the motion to set 
aside default judgment was conditioned upon the payment of 
additional attorneys fees. 
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A second affidavit, also uncontroverted by counter-
affidavit, was submitted to the court (Record, pg. 29), 
stating that defendant was impecunious, and, owing to her 
poverty, was unable to bear the expenses of the legal pro-
ceedings commenced, and that she believed she was justly 
entitled to the relief sought. A third affidavit of defendant, 
again uncontroverted by counteraffidavit, alleged wrongdoing 
by plaintiff in the execution of the default judgment (Record, 
pg. 37-38) . 
In three hearings conducted in the lower court, 
all before the same judge, the arguments contained in this 
Brief were presented, and the affidavits of defendant sub-
mitted. In conditioning the grant of an order setting aside 
the default judgment upon the payment of attorney's fees, 
the lower court abused its discretion and thus committed 
reversible error. 
The practical consequences of conditioning relief 
on the payment of money by an impoverished individual should 
be considered. Obviously, an impecunious person who cannot 
afford even the basic court costs of maintaining or defending 
a lawsuit cannot pay the sum of $150.00. Thus the order of 
the court, as applied to a poor person, is the functional 
equivalent of unconditionally denying her motion. As applied 
to the facts and circumstances of this case, the effect of 
-14-
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the court's ruling is that defendant is not entitled to 
relief merely because of her poverty. This result, with its 
precedential effect, must not be permitted by this Court on 
appeal. 
Viewing the facts and circumstances of his case in 
light of the statutory and case law, the lower court should 
have set aside the default judgment. First, it is question-
able whether defendant was properly served with the Complaint, 
and thus, whether the lower court had jurisdiction to enter 
its judgment. The uncontroverted affidavit of defendant 
(Record pg. 15-16) alleges that she was never served with 
the Complaint. Plaintiff's affidavit also disputes the 
amount and nature of the default judgment, and this Brief 
addresses other improprieties in Plaintiff's actions and in 
the default judgment. This Court in Stan Katz Real Estate, 
Inc. remanded the matter on much the same basis. 
Second, the motion to set aside the default judgment 
was timely filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The basis for the motion, as stated in several 
uncontroverted supporting affidavits, demonstrates reason-
able grounds and excuse for the failure of defendant to 
appear and defend the lawsuit. 
Defendant's affidavits reveal substantial uncertain~ 
regarding the appropriateness of the provisions of the default 
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judgment. Those provisions and the subsequent actions by 
Plaintiff, show that it would not be just or equitable to 
allow the judgment to stand. In the interest of fair play, 
defendant should be afforded the opportunity to defend her 
case on the merits. 
Finally, the lower court's decision is contrary to 
the liberal and indulgent position taken by this Court in 
setting aside default judgments by conditioning its ruling 
upon a requirement that a litigant cannot meet. There is no 
reason, based upon the previously enunciated principles, for 
the court to deny defendant's motion. There only remains 
the condition of paying attorney's fees -- a condition 
unsupported by law or equity. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant requests this 
Court to reverse the decision of the lower court, to Order 
the default judgment be set aside, and to remand the matter 
to District Court for a hearing on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TRICIA DeMICHELE 
~ttorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I hand-delivered two copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Wendell E. Bennett, 
Attorney for Respondant, 370 East 500 South, Suite 100, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on this 23rd day of June 
1978. 
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